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1.  INTRODUCTION
General
1.1. Projects or programmes financed under the Lome ´
Conventions may be financed by grant or risk capital
from the European Development Funds (EDF) or by
loans from the European Investments Bank’s (EIB or the
Bank) own resources or jointly by two or more of these
means of financing (1). This report deals with the use of
risk capital resources.
1.2. Risk capital constitutes a special method of
financing that exists under both the Lome ´ III and Lome ´
IV Convention allowing reimbursable financial assistance
to be given under favourable conditions to priority
sectors in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States
and overseas countries and territories (OCT) in particular
where the beneficiaries’ capacity to borrow does not
allow financing from the own resources of the EIB (2).
1.3. Risk capital funds forming part of the EDF (3) are
administered by the EIB on behalf of the Community and
in accordance with the Bank’s Statute and the Financial
Regulations related to the EDF (4).
1.4. The amounts earmarked for risk capital operations
(RCOs) under the Lome ´ III and Lome ´ IV Conventions
are respectively ECU 615 million and ECU 850 million.
Of these totals, the amounts decided (5), net
commitments and disbursements (for ACP States only) as
at 31 December 1997 are given in Table 1. Of the funds
available under the Lome ´ III and Lome ´ IV Conventions
88 % has been committed. However, only 64 % of the
funds has been disbursed to the loan recipients.
(1)  Article 233 of the Lome ´ IV Convention (OJ L 229,
17.8.1991).
(2) Where in this report the term ACP State is used, this means
ACP State and OCT and if there is a need to refer to the
legal framework for risk capital operations, this is done in
relation to Lome ´ IV only. Relevant provisions of the Lome ´
III framework will only be mentioned in as far as they
comprise deviations from that for Lome ´ IV.
(3) See Article 10(2) of the Internal Agreement (IA) on the
financing and administration of Community aid under the
Lome ´ IV Convention (OJ L 229, 17.8.1991).
(4) See Article 15(1) of the IA.
(5)  Including amounts decided upon but for which initial
commitment has been annulled.
Conduct of the audit
1.5. In carrying out its audit, the Court has taken into
account the recommendation of the European
Parliament (6) in which it ‘invited the Commission, the
EIB and the Court of Auditors to make regular and
frequent on-the-spot audits of actions realised by the EIB
under mandate’.
1.6. The Court’s audit constitutes the third examination
of aid operations managed by the EIB under mandate for
the EDF (7) and has been conducted on the basis of the
Tripartite Agreement concluded between the EIB, the
Commission and the Court of Auditors (8). The main
relevant observations related to its two earlier audits
were:
a)  documentation concerning management of risk capital
funds by EIB in Commission files insufficient and
insufficiently used;
b) the EIB acts more as a commercial bank than as a
development bank.
1.7. The Commission’s files still appeared to be
incomplete and not fully utilised although extensive
documentation was made available by the Bank to the
services of the Commission and although the filing
system was improved in the course of the Court’s audit.
In the course of the audit, supplementary information
was requested from the Bank.
1.8. Generally speaking, cooperation with the Bank has
been good, particularly during on-the-spot missions.
However, some important information was provided at
such a late stage that it hampered an efficient conduct of
the Court’s audit.
1.9. Information concerning the results of official
invitations to tender, other than in the form of
procurement tables containing only very global
information, has never been received.
(6) See resolution containing observations forming part of the
decisions to give discharge to the Commission for its
management of the fifth, sixth and seventh EDF during the
1993 financial year — PE 189.073/58.
(7) See 1984 special report, May 1984, and the annual report
for the year 1991, paragraphs 17.42 — 17.61 (OJ C 330,
15.12.1992).
(8) The Court also recently published in its Special Report 1/98
observations regarding risk capital operations managed by
the EIB from budget resources in respect of the bilateral
financial and technical cooperation with the Mediterranean
countries (OJ C 98, 31.3.1998).C 389/46 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
1.10. The Court has examined 42 RCOs out of which
33 projects were visited on the spot (9) comprising an
examination of the operations of financial intermediaries
(FIs) and of the final beneficiaries of the risk capital
financing (cf. Annex I).
2.  RISK CAPITAL AS A FINANCIAL AID INSTRUMENT
Types of risk capital financing
2.1. Risk capital is used for investment financing in
order to assist the implementation of directly productive
investment, both public and private, contributing to the
economic and industrial development of the ACP states
(cf. Article 263 of the Lome ´ IV Convention).
2.2. As specified by Article 234 of the Lome ´I V
Convention, risk capital may be provided in the form of
loans or equity participation.
2.3. Within the category of loans, global loans constitute
a special form of conditional loan and can be compared
with ‘credit lines’ opened with financial institutions.
These institutions which can be situated in the ACP
States (financial institutions or small local venture capital
companies) or the Member States of the Community will
— subject to the Bank’s approval — on-lend the funds to
the final beneficiary, in particular SMEs, in the form of
individual sub-loans or equity participations.
2.4. Loans with participating rights constitute a special
form of risk capital financing introduced by the Bank to
bring conditional or subordinated loans more in line with
the concept of quasi-capital (10). These loans normally
have remunerations comprising firstly a fixed interest
component and secondly a variable component set as a
percentage of dividends paid.
2.5. In the case of equity participation, risk capital funds
are used to acquire on behalf of the Community
temporary minority holdings in the capital of ACP
enterprises or institutions financing development projects
(9)  Dominican Republic, Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Mozambique and New Caledonia.
(10) Loan with equity characteristics.
or promoting and financing investments in ACP States.
For a breakdown of the types of risk capital financing,
see Annex II.
Intervention sectors and allocation of funds
2.6. The main guideline for the Bank’s interventions in
the area of RCOs is to be found in Article 236 of the
Lome ´ IV Convention. This Article stipulates that the
Bank should finance in the first instance productive
projects and programmes in industry, agro-industry,
tourism, mining, energy and in transport and
telecommunications linked to these sectors.
2.7. A total amount of ECU 406 or 49 % of available
funds under Lome ´ IV (ECU 270 million or 45 % under
Lome ´ III) had been allocated to the 46 least developed
ACP states in the form of guaranteed minimum amounts
in the National Indicative Programme (NIP). For 14 of
them (Lome ´ IV), the amounts of RCOs decided upon at
the end of 1997 stayed ECU 1 million or more below
these minimum amounts.
2.8. Few (global) guidelines for risk capital financing of
individual projects or programmes exist. Article 233.2 of
the Lome ´ IV Convention (Article 197.2 and 3 of the
Lome ´ III Convention) gives criteria to be considered in
deciding upon the method(s) of financing for aid projects
or programmes:
(a) the level of development, the geographical situation
and economic and financial circumstances of the ACP
States;
(b) the nature of the project or programme, its economic
and financial return as well as its social and cultural
impact;
(c) in the case of loans the factors guaranteeing their
servicing.
2.9. The main orientation given by the Bank for the use
of risk capital funds (11) is that it considers it as an
alternative financing instrument to its own resources to
be used in cases where financing from own resources is
considered inappropriate. The Bank chooses between risk
capital and own resources financing on the basis of: the
creditworthiness of a country and the overall economic
(11) Source: EIB reply to a general questionnaire from the Court,
August 5, 1996, PA/ACP-111/JRL.C 389/47 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
and political situation of the country; the existence of
securities or guarantees in relation to the financing; the
structure of the project financing; and the financial
assistance required.
2.10. The criteria defined in the Lome ´ IV Convention
and by the Bank are broad so that any judgement as to
whether the financing of a project is appropriate is
subjective. As a matter of fact the financing proposals (12)
examined do not contain a clear and distinct evaluation
of the criteria mentioned above in justifying the choice to
finance the action wholly or partially from risk capital
resources. A more explicit justification however would
make the decision to finance from risk capital more
transparent.
2.11. In this context, the Court found a number of
operations financed from risk capital resources for which
it is debatable, whether the risk elements that should be
inherent to this type of operation were present and
whether they needed such funding.
2.12. These were:
(a)  the modernisation of joint venture fishing fleets in
Mozambique and in Madagascar in which their
Governments have minority stakes. The joint venture
operations are profitable and generate hard currency
for repayment of the loans so that other sources of
financing could have been found;
(b)  in the Dominican Republic the proceeds of the two
global loans given to a financial intermediary have
been used in its entirety for on-lending to established
SMEs which had proven to be successful in their
operations. In several cases the loan would have been
given to the final beneficiary even without the EIB
global loan being available;
(c)  the use of risk capital funds in the form of global
loans and a loan with participating rights in New
Caledonia, where other sources of funding could
easily have been mobilised.
Stricter criteria and guidelines for the utilisation of risk
capital funds should be developed, in order to obtain an
additional value for development purposes.
(12)  Financing proposal for the operation discussed in the
Committee mentioned in Article 28 of the IA for the Lome ´
IV Convention (OJ L 229, 17.8.1991) or in Article 22 of the
IA for the Lome ´ III Convention (OJ L 86, 31.3.1986).
The implementation of risk capital operations by the
European Investment Bank
Tendering procedures
2.13. In managing the tendering procedures under Lome ´
III, the Bank decided that contracts would be awarded
under a competitive procedure taking into account the
specific character of the project and the type of
expenditure. However, the Bank did not comply with the
EDF rule that tenders should be open only to firms
having their main seat in ACP or EU Member States.
2.14. The documentation made available by the Bank in
the form of procurement tables did not allow the Court
to establish that the conduct of the tender procedure has
been in compliance with the EDF rules, i.e. those
stipulating that supplies should originate in EU Member
or ACP States, unless a derogation applies. However, in
several cases supplies originated in non-ACP and non-EU
Member States.
2.15. For the Cahora Bassa project, the works at the
northern part (financed from EDF resources managed by
the Commission) and the southern part (financed from
EIB own resources and EDF risk capital funds) of the
transmission line have been the subject of two different
tenders and contracts although they were finally awarded
to the same contractor. The reason for this is that the
Commission and the Bank could not agree on the tender
conditions as EDF procurement rules differed from those
used by the Bank (i. e. rules of origin on supplies from
South Africa). The Court welcomes the change in the
Bank’s policy in 1995 by which it now applies EDF rules
at least under Lome ´ IV.
Loan conditions and undertakings
2.16. Several cases occurred where undertakings by ACP
States or beneficiaries were not or not fully met. In
particular, they had not submitted the necessary
information such as progress reports, project completion
reports, audited financial statements or for the FIs reports
on the performance of the final beneficiaries (13).
Furthermore, although detailed analyses of the
(13)  See also paragraph 1.31 of Special Report 1/98.C 389/48 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
beneficiaries’ economic and financial performances were
received by the Court during its missions, the Bank did
not confirm receiving these systematically from the
financial intermediaries (FIs) (14). On this particular
point, the financial contracts between the EIB and the FIs
are not clear, the respective articles allowing for different
interpretations as regards the FIs’ obligations.
2.17. Other cases concern:
(a)  the borrower’s (ACP State) failure to make available
to the final beneficiary foreign currency (of about
ECU 2 million) in exchange for an equivalent amount
in local currency in spite of several reminders given by
the Bank during its on-the-spot missions;
(b)  ECU 6 million of risk capital that was assigned to be
used for the modernisation of a fishing fleet. Although
the project as such is being successfully implemented,
there are concerns about the protection of fish
resources of the ACP State. Although data for the
total allowable catch, submitted by the borrower, are
incomplete, they already show that the ceiling for
total allowable catch was set above the level
mentioned in the financing proposal for the project.
At the same time, the total number of fishing licences
issued has also increased;
(c)  ECU 3,2 million of risk capital was assigned to the
modernisation of fishing boats and the equipment for
the treatment of prawns. The Government of
Madagascar continued to issue further fishing licences
despite a commitment to the contrary and reminders
from the Bank. The observed reduction in the
quantities of fish caught per hour of fishing would
already indicate that there is over-fishing.
2.18. The Bank’s reactions in such situations have been
inconsistent: in a number of cases reminders were sent to
the borrower, in other cases the Bank would appear to
have accepted the situation.
3.  INTEREST RATES AND THE USE OF THE INTEREST
MARGIN IN CASE OF ON-LENDING OPERATIONS
General
3.1. The only direct reference to interest rates applicable
to RCOs is made in Article 234.1(c) of the Lome ´I V
(14)  See also Special Report 1/98 in respect of the bilateral
financial and technical cooperation with the Mediterranean
countries, paragraph 1.31.
Convention. It stipulates that in the case of loans the
interest rate shall be, in any case, less than 3 %. For
Lome ´ III the Convention (15) provides that the interest
rate shall be determined by reference to the
characteristics of each project and shall not be higher
than 8 %.
3.2. When funds are on-lent to the beneficiaries through
a financial institution in the ACP State or its
Government, the intermediaries benefit in the first
instance from a rate lower than 3 %. Final beneficiaries
pay higher interest rates unless loans are granted to them
directly by the Bank or the intermediary on-lends on the
same conditions.
3.3. The margin between the two interest rates is
destined to enable the intermediary to cover
administrative costs, exchange and financial risks and the
cost of technical assistance given to the final recipient.
Any remaining amount is to be used for development
purposes (16).
Level of the interest
3.4. For the projects examined, where loans were made
through the governments of ACP States interest rates
were generally set below market rates.
3.5. For loans on-lent to SMEs by a financial institution,
interest rates are usually set at market level for several
reasons: to avoid distortion of competition; to mitigate
the risk of irregularities occurring in the selection of
beneficiaries (risk of corruption); and to make loan
beneficiaries self supporting in the longer term. For the
final beneficiary the only advantage of this risk capital
financing is that it provides easier access to medium- or
long-term financing.
3.6. Loans from the Bank’s own resources benefit from
an EDF interest subsidy paid. This could lead to a
situation where the net interest rate on the Bank’s own
resources loans to be paid by the final beneficiaries is
lower than that for risk capital loans. For example, for
(15)  Articles 196(3b) and 199(4).
(16)  See Article 233.4(b) of the Lome ´ IV Convention.C 389/49 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
an investment in a hotel complex in Guinea, the interest
rate charged on the EIB own resources loan was 3 %
whilst the risk capital loan through a financial
intermediary was 8 %.
3.7. From a development policy point of view, the
Bank’s policy to set interest rates for SMEs at market
level and to use more concessional interest rates for larger
sized enterprises in the private and public sector is against
the spirit of the Lome ´ Convention and can lead to an
unbalanced situation in the allocation of the advantages
of risk capital financing to the beneficiaries.
3.8. The following examples are given to illustrate the
above situation:
(a)  an electricity producing and distributing company in
the Dominican Republic has received a 6 % loan
under an on-lending agreement with the Government
of the Dominican Republic and with the exchange
rate risk to be borne by the beneficiary. In the same
country SMEs have to pay interest rates of between
22 % and 32 % for loans on-lent to them by a FI,
however, with the exchange rate risks to be borne by
the intermediary;
(b)  in Mozambique a local subsidiary of an European
enterprise active in fisheries borrowed at an interest
rate of 4 % from the Government through an
on-lending agreement. The exchange rate risk it had
to bear was limited as its operations generated hard
currency. Newly established SMEs paid interest rates
varying between 40 and 46 % on on-lending
agreements with FIs as the latter had to cover the
exchange rate and the inflation risks.
3.9. In a number of loan contracts (concluded under the
provisions of the Lome ´ IV Convention) the total
remuneration to the EIB allows the interest
(remuneration) on the loan to exceed 3 %, in particular
in the case of loans with participating rights (see
paragraph 2.4) (17). Such additional yield is not provided
for by the Lome ´ Convention.
Remuneration of financial allocations from global loans
3.10. For several cases the Court was not able to verify
that the rates applied by the FIs were in compliance with
(17) See also annual report for the financial year 1996, volume II
statement of assurance, paragraph 22.24(a) (OJ C 348,
18.11.1997).
the conditions set in the loan contract concluded between
the intermediary and the Bank either because ‘reference’
rates did not exist (for example in Haiti) or because
definition of the rates applied by the FIs made a
comparison with ‘reference’ rates impossible. The
following cases illustrate problems encountered as regards
the remuneration:
(a) in the Dominican Republic the interest rates for some
sub-loans, of which the rates varied between 20 %
and 26 % in January 1997, were higher than the
‘preferential rate’ published by the Central Bank of
about 20 % and applicable since October 1996. This
rate constitutes the reference rate for the FI to set the
interest rate for its loans. According to the Bank, rates
used by the FI had been in line with the ‘preferential
rate’ up to October 1996. The discrepancy is now
being investigated by the Bank;
(b)  in the case of another global loan to a FI in
Madagascar, the finance contract stipulated that
sub-loans should bear a global effective interest rate
including cost, commissions and other remunerations,
reflecting rates used in that country for operations of
the same nature, duration and amount and agreed
upon by the Bank. In this case it appears hardly
possible to establish whether the rates were set in
conformity with the Bank’s guidelines.
3.11. In such cases, the Bank should have ensured that
‘reference’ rates mentioned in finance contracts do
actually exist in the countries concerned and allow for
proper verification of the interest rates applied by the
FIs.
Mechanisms used for covering the exchange rate risk
3.12. In the case of on-lending of the initial loan in a
different currency, the finance contracts allocate the
exchange rate risks between the final beneficiaries and
the initial borrower.
3.13. Under Lome ´ III the risk was entirely for the
borrower who had to pay back the loan in ecu or
another European currency. In the case of an on-lending
operation the risk is (partially) transferred to the
beneficiary under the sub-loan contract through a higher
interest rate.
3.14. The Lome ´ IV Convention (Article 234.2) provided
for a change by stipulating that:C 389/50 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
(a) the risk is as a general rule borne by the Community
in the case of risk capital financing to strengthen the
enterprises’ own funds;
(b)  it should be shared between the Community and
other parties involved in the case of risk capital
financing for investments of private sector firms and
SMEs.
3.15. Article 234.2(b) also stipulates that on average the
foreign exchange rate risk shall be shared equally. This
Article needs clarification as to how it should be applied,
when and by whom and how calculations for this
purpose should be made as well as what use is to be
made of the results.
3.16. Moreover, the Convention does not indicate what
arrangements are to be made for the exchange rate risk in
case of on-lending of funds to the non-private sector or
other than SMEs.
3.17. The exchange rate risk problem which constitutes
a major element in setting the level of the interest rate for
the on-lending operation is dealt with in different ways
by the Bank for reasons not evident to the Court:
(a)  in the first of two similar projects provisions for
sharing the exchange rate risk between beneficiary
and Community are non-existent whereas for the
other the Community would bear at maximum 25 %
of the exchange risk;
(b) in another case, the financial contract with the loan
beneficiary foresees that the exchange rate risks are
borne entirely by the beneficiary which is in
contradiction with the respective provision of the
Lome ´ IV Convention;
(c) in Mozambique, Madagascar and New Caledonia, FIs
had not constituted at the time of the Court’s mission
the so-called exchange rate risk funds as stipulated in
the finance contracts. In addition, finance contracts
do not stipulate for what purpose any balance left
from the exchange rate risk fund is to be used after
the loan has been repaid.
Use of the interest margin for administrative cost and for
development purposes
3.18. In a number of cases, administrative arrangements
for determining the portion of the margin (including any
yields from participations) to be used for administrative
cost and development purposes were either lacking,
contrary to the provisions of the Lome ´ IV Convention,
incomplete or not precise. The Bank should take actions
to ensure that the provisions of the Lome ´I V
Convention (18) on the use of the margin are being
respected i. e. that any net benefit for the intermediaries
is to be used for concrete development purposes.
4.  PROJECTS FINANCED WITH RISK CAPITAL
Scope
4.1. Though the investments forming part of the RCOs
have been adequately prepared, implemented and
monitored by the Bank, the following observations are
being made which relate to the long-term viability of the
projects, the allocation procedures and disbursement
period and rate in the case of global loans and delays in
implementation.
Factors relating to the ‘long-term viability of the
project’
4.2. In the following cases the ‘long-term viability of the
project’ is endangered even if the preparation and the
implementation of the investments have been sound. Even
when formally the Bank and the Commission have few
possibilities to intervene after the investments have been
realised, they should find ways to ensure that there is
effective monitoring at national level of projects to avoid
problems as cited below:
(a) ECU 13 million of risk capital were assigned to a
ECU 42 million investment plan to restore the
production capacity and to improve the productivity
and the reliability of the industrial installations of an
alumina producing factory. Other investments in
plant and equipment required to guarantee the
viability of the operations have been canceled or put
off by the company which has used the funds
becoming thus available, to offset losses that the
shareholders had originally agreed to bear as laid
down in a Memorandum of Understanding between
the two main shareholders;
(b)  ECU 20 million of risk capital were assigned to a
ECU 152 million project (meanwhile reduced to a
(18)  See article 233.4(b) of the Lome ´ IV Convention.C 389/51 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
ECU 120 million project) for the rehabilitation of a
power transmission line linking the hydroelectric
station in Mozambique with the electricity net of
South Africa (RSA). Because the tariff rate for the
supply of electricity to RSA (negotiated in 1975 and
laid down in a contract that cannot be changed) is
considerably lower than the current rates, the full
recovery of cost will become very difficult, on top of
losses made so far;
(c)  ECU 6 million of risk capital were assigned to the
construction of two facilities (of ECU 3 million each)
for the processing of cashew nuts. The first project,
decided upon in 1992, started its operations with the
1995/96 campaign. The second one decided upon in
1995, has been suspended by the promoter, due to
the unclear and risky situation in the cashew nut
market. The two projects suffer from an unclear and
changing policy of the government in the cashew nut
sector;
(d)  ECU 14 million of risk capital was assigned to the
financing of an agro-industrial project comprising the
establishment of new estates and facilities to process
rubber and palm oil using the output from both
family and industrial plantations (Soguipah).
However, insufficient attention was paid to factors
such as access to markets, marketing of the product
and the acceptability of the palm oil for local tastes.
The sustainability of the operations that provides
employment for 1 686 people and work and income
opportunities to locals in the region, is uncertain with
accumulated losses in the period 1992-1995
amounting to more than 50 % of the share capital,
access to markets being limited and the company
being heavily dependent on grants and loan finance;
(e)  in Madagascar and the Dominican Republic, the
creation of new jobs in five out of the 11 SMEs
visited by the Court and having benefitted from the
EDF risk capital funds to the sum of ECU 783 000
has not reached the figures expected and mentioned
in the loan allocation reports. In the case of one of
these companies, the majority shareholder had not
met its commitment to invest in the newly established
SME which then appeared to have a negative impact
on the latter’s commercial operations for the years
1994 and 1995.
Allocation procedures in respect of global loans
4.3. Global loans for on-lending to SMEs are used for
both the set up of new activities and the expansion of
existing activities. For the cases examined, by far the
greatest part of the financing from global loans was used
by FIs for financing the expansion of operations of
existing clients (19). Some of them would probably have
received a loan from the intermediaries’ own resources.
Details of loan allocations are given in Table 2.
4.4. In New Caledonia global loans had been also used
for the refinancing of operations which already had been
the subject of loans granted by the FI from its ‘own
resources’ or for operations which had been previously
financed by the SME from its own treasury. The
additional value in terms of development aid is not
evident in such cases.
Disbursement period and disbursement rate
4.5. Disbursement periods for global loans are set in the
finance contract between the Bank and the FI and
normally cover a three-year period with the possibility of
an extension to be decided upon by the Bank. For details
of disbursement periods, see Table 3.
4.6. The low disbursement rate in Mozambique was
partially due to the existence of competitive loans with
less restrictive conditions, as well as to the high inflation
rate and corresponding high, on-lending interest rates
(40-46 %). In Madagascar, the general economic
situation (devaluation of franc malgache in 1994) has
constituted a hindrance for the creation or expansion of
SMEs.
4.7. In Madagascar and Mozambique the financial
intermediaries did not immediately make available the
proceeds of the EIB loans to the beneficiaries. In one case
the financial intermediary retained ECU 100 000 of the
EIB funds allocated to the final beneficiary without any
explanation being available.
Delay in implementation of projects and actions
4.8. In its annual report for the financial year 1996,
Volume II statement of assurance (20), the Court
mentioned the existence of RCOs for which there had
been no disbursement for at least 18 months.
4.9. The Court has found a number of projects for
which implementation has been severely delayed for a
(19) See also Special Report 1/98, paragraph 1.30.
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variety of reasons, leading to a situation where risk
capital funds have been committed without the funds
being effectively used:
(a) in December 1994, a finance contract was concluded
for the rehabilitation of a crude oil pipeline. The
provisional disbursement timetable foresaw
disbursements of ECU 9 million for the period
1995-1997. At the end of the year 1997, only ECU
0,4 million had been disbursed but the annual report
on the conduct of the operation as at 31 December
1995 compiled by the Bank did not contain any
particular remark in respect of the delay;
(b) a ECU 14 million loan to the Government of Ethiopia
for a regional telecommunication project was
disbursed for ECU 0,6 million only at the end of the
year 1997, although the project was estimated at
appraisal to be completed in December 1996.
Disbursement of the remainder of the loan has been
blocked because of serious problems with the tender
for the switching of telephone lines, identified by the
Bank (21) but not yet solved by the latter;
(c)  in the Dominican Republic, the Bank granted in
December 1994 a ECU 15 million conditional loan to
the Government for the study, design,
implementation, commercial commissioning and
operation of investments, as part of a wider project
with estimated cost of ECU 47 million, in the
transmission network in the capital city and the South
and East parts of the country. The project, expected
to be commissioned by the end of 1996 had not
started by the end of 1997.
4.10. Therefore, the Commission should, in consultation
with the Bank, formulate a policy on the decommitment
of ‘sleeping’ balances of RCOs.
Management of global loans by European Community
Financial Intermediaries (ECFIs)
4.11. A global amount of ECU 15 million has been
made available to ECFIs in the form of conditional loans
(see also paragraph 2.3). The utilisation rate of this ECU
15 million facility has been rather low: at August 1997,
four and a half years after the finance contracts were
signed and nineteen months after the initial allocation
period had expired, 100 % of the global loan amount
had been allocated but only 42 % disbursed. In seven of
the twelve EU Member states (B, D, EL, IRL, I, L, P) no
use had been made of the facility so far.
(21)  See EIB periodic progress report dated 22.10.1996.
4.12. According to the ECFIs visited by the Court the
reasons for the low utilisation rate are: the time it has
taken for the facility to become known, the limitations
set for the amounts of individual allocations, and a lack
of suitable projects. Disbursement is further delayed
because of the time-consuming set up of legal and
administrative frameworks within which investments are
to operate.
4.13. Acknowledging that it is important that risk
capital funds are made available widely and at different
levels, some participations were noted where the
efficiency and the transparency of the funding
arrangements are questionnable:
(a)  in the case of investments in venture capital funds
(VCF) there appeared to be four levels through which
funds pass before they reach the final beneficiary (the
SME) which would appear to be costly (commissions
and fees) and time consuming;
(b)  for an investment in Guinea (Conakry), two different
forms of financing from risk capital were used
through two different intermediaries in combination
with the direct financing by the Bank from its own
resources under a variety of conditions.
5.  ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
5.1. As already mentioned (see paragraph 1.3), the Bank
administers risk capital from the Fund’s resources on
behalf of the Community and also undertakes the
financial execution of operations carried out with risk
capital.
5.2. Based on Article 11 of the IA, ‘the Commission
shall be responsible for implementing the aid policy
defined by the Council and the guidelines for
development finance cooperation defined by the
ACP-EEC Council of Ministers pursuant to Article 325
of the Convention’. For this purpose and to ensure a
certain coordination between the Commission and the
Bank, the IA mentions the exchange of information
between the Bank and the Commission (22) (see
paragraph 1.7).
5.3. To fulfil its role stipulated in Article 11, it would
therefore be of primary importance for the Commission
to follow critically the appraisal process carried out by
the EIB. However, on the operations which have been
(22)  See for example Articles 12(1) and 12(2), 17(4)and 30(4) of
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examined in the course of the audit, the Court has only
found very little written evidence of active participation
be it in the Commission’s files or in the minutes of the
Article 28 Committee. The quality and scope of the
reactions to the Bank’s proposals by the central services
of the Commission as well as the exchange of
information with Delegations depends mainly upon the
initiative of the respective Commission officers.
5.4. The formulation of guidelines for the procedures to
follow and the main elements to be considered in giving a
reaction to the proposals of the Bank would make such
reactions more transparent and valuable.
5.5. Article 33.6 of the IA provides that the Commission
shall draw up periodically, in agreement with the Bank,
lists of the information it receives from the latter in order
to assess how the Bank is carrying out its brief and
encourage close coordination between the Commission
and the Bank.
5.6. For the purpose of such assessment, a number of
reports envisaged by the IA could, in principle, be very
helpful such as:
(a)  the report on the evaluation of the projects to be
provided periodically by the Commission and the
Bank to the Council, in particular in relation to
development objectives set (23). However, these reports
have not been produced;
(b)  the report on the execution of operations financed
from the fund resources managed by the Bank to be
provided yearly (24). However, these reports are
mainly based on the commitments of funds following
financing decisions taken and on economic data
presented in the appraisal stage of the operations.
5.7. For none of the operations examined by the Court
the Bank made an ex post evaluation of projects financed
with risk capital resources. No information on evaluation
is thus provided.
5.8. The Commission has not carried out any audit or
evaluation missions or activities in relation to risk capital
operations either. Based on the above, it is therefore not
(23)  See Article 30.6 of the IA.
(24)  See Article 33.5 of the IA.
clear how and to what extent the Commission has
fulfilled its obligations under the articles of the IA.
6.  CONCLUSION
6.1. The manner in which risk capital operations have
been prepared, implemented and monitored by the Bank
does not give rise to observations. Nevertheless, the
transparency and effectiveness of the operations can still
be improved.
6.2. Important information was provided by the Bank at
a late stage which hampered an efficient conduct of the
Court’s audit (see paragraphs 1.8 — 1.9).
6.3. The criteria which should guide the allocation of
risk capital resources are very general. The Bank is thus
more or less free to choose between risk capital or its
own resources in making loans. The justification of the
decision to use risk capital funds for a project does not
clearly emerge from the project appraisal documentation
(see paragraphs 2.10 — 2.12) (25).
6.4. The use of different types of financing (direct loans,
loans via an ACP State, global loans) has led to unequal
treatment of final beneficiaries: while some benefit from
the 3 % maximum interest rate mentioned in the Lome ´
Convention, the others have to pay market rates. Though
not the only determining factor, the effects of exchange
rate fluctuations play an important role in setting interest
rates above the 3 % level. These effects and thus the
justification for higher interest rates can be calculated
only after loans have been fully repaid. In addition, in the
case of loans with participating rights, the total
remuneration to the EIB — being at least partly
dependent on the result of the beneficiary enterprises —
could well exceed the 3 % limit (see paragraphs 3.4 —
3.9).
6.5. The principle of an average equal sharing of the
foreign exchange rate risk introduced by the Lome ´I V
Convention is limited to investments in the private sector
or in SMEs and further needs to be clarified. Different
formulae were used by the Bank in order to adhere to it
sometimes involving rather heavy administrative
arrangements (see paragraphs 3.12 — 3.17).
(25)  See also paragraphs 1.22, 1.24 of Special Report 1/98.C 389/54 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
6.6. Provisions concerning the use of the interest margin
by the financial intermediary are often not clear. The
Bank should ensure that finance contracts stipulate
precisely how the amount of the interest margin is to be
used and that any such use is in compliance with the
provisions of the Lome ´ IV Convention (see paragraph
3.18).
6.7. Support to the private sector through global loans
has been given mainly to existing — instead of emerging
— SMEs which moreover often benefitted from financing
from the FIs’ other resources (see paragraphs 4.3 —
4.4) (26).
6.8. In a number of cases the effectiveness of the RCOs
for development purposes is hampered by the fact that
the disbursement of funds is delayed or because the
long-term viability of the operations financed is being
threatened (see paragraphs 4.2, 4.8 — 4.10).
6.9. An ex post evaluation function is needed to provide
information about the viability of operations having
benefitted from risk capital finance and their real
contribution to the economic and social development of
the ACP states. Such an evaluation system should be
developed in cooperation between the Bank and the
Commission (see paragraph 5.6).
6.10. In addition, the Commission should have played a
more active role at the appraisal stage and regarding the
evaluation of the overall effects of RCO on the
development of the ACP State. Guidelines should be
developed setting out the responsibilities of and the
procedures to be followed by the services concerned (see
paragraph 5.8).
6.11. The preceding recommendations are made in the
context of improving the existent systems of the
management of RCOs. However, alternative systems
should be considered. As a matter of fact, the
Commission’s role in the management of the RCOs
seems to be limited in practice to an exchange of
information with the Bank. The involvement of the
Commission in a number of tasks (appraisal, accounting,
monitoring and evaluation), which are indeed not clearly
defined, are not adhered to by the Commission. It is
therefore that the Court proposes alternatively that
consideration should be given to the possibility to entrust
the entire management of RCO to the Bank outside the
European Development Funds. In this context it is noted
that repayments of risk capital funds and the received
yields on the funds already remain outside the EDF.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors at the Court meeting of 14 and 15 October
1998.
For the Court of Auditors
Bernhard FRIEDMANN
President
(26)  See also paragraphs 1.25 — 1.30 of Special Report 1/98.C 389/55 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
Table 1
Utilisation of risk capital funds
(in Mio. ECU)
Amount
available
Amout
decided
Net
commitment
%
Amount
disbursed
%
Lome ´ III 600,0
— Loans 644,5 500,0 83 494,5 83
— Direct participations 1,0 1,0 0 0,5 0
645,5 501,0 83 495,0 82
Lome ´ IV 825,0
— Loans 763,0 732,5 89 395,0 48
— Direct participations 24,5 24,5 3 16,5 2
787,5 756,5 92 411,5 50
TOTAL 1 425,0 1 433,0 1 257,0 88 906,5 64
Table 2
Loan allocations (*)
Project
Total number of
allocations
Value
(million ECU)
Number of
allocations to
newly established
companies
%
6 MOZ 071 3 1,9 2 67
7 MAG 050 + MAG 051 11 1,1 9 82
7 HA 028 12 1,8 3 25
7 DO 014 + 7 DO 031 144 11,0 — 0
6 NC 011 + 7 NC 017 + NC 016 15 7,8 2 13
7 GPR 003 27 15,0 18 67
TOTAL 212 38,6 34 16
(*) Including  participations.C 389/56 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
Table 3
Disbursement periods
Project Disbursement rate Time period elapsed Observation
6 MOZ 071 32 % After 3 years Cancelled for the rest
6 MAG 050 10 % After 3 years
7 MAG 051 40 % After 2,5 years
7 HA 028 100 % After 2 years
7 DO 014 100 % After 2 years
7 DO 031 100 % After 3 years
6 NC 11 100 % After 3 years
7 NC 17 70 % After 3,5 years
7 GPR 003 42 % After 4,5 yearsC 389/57 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
ANNEX I
Table I.1
SUMMARY OF RCOs EXAMINED
Country Intervention sector
Amount in million ECU
Committed Disbursed
Mozambique Global loan 6,0 1,9
Agro-industrial 3,0 3,0
Fisheries 6,0 4,7
Energy 20,0 12,5
Agro-industrial 3,0 —
Sub-total 38,0 22,1
Madagascar Energy 2,0 2,0
Energy 13,5 13,5
Agro-industrial 1,3 1,3
Agro-industrial 4,4 4,4
Agro-industrial 0,4 0,4
Agro-industrial 1,0 1,0
Agro-industrial 1,8 1,8
Global loan 1,0 0,1
Global loan 1,0 0,7
Agro-industrial 3,5 3,5
Sub-total 29,9 28,7
Guinea Industrial 13,0 13,0
Water 6,0 6,0
Hydro-electric power stations 19,0 6,0
Hydro-electric power stations 6,0 —
Water 8,0 7,4
Agro-industrial 14,0 14,0
Thermal power stations 20,0 17,3
Sub-total 86,0 63,7
Mauritania Energy 5,0 4,9
Mining 10,0 10,0
Mining 10,0 10,0
Mining 1,5 1,5
Mining 5,0 5,0
Sub-total 31,5 31,4
Dominican Republic Global loan 3,0 3,0
Energy 15,0 —
Global loan 8,0 8,0
Sub-total 26,0 11,0
Haiti Global loan 4,0 4,0
Sub-total 4,0 4,0C 389/58 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
Country Intervention sector
Amount in million ECU
Committed Disbursed
New Caledonia Global loan 3,0 3,0
Global loan 4,0 3,0
Loan with participating rights 2,0 2,0
Sub-total 9,0 8,0
Uganda Global loan 15,0 13,0
Sub-total 15,0 13,0
Ethiopia Telecommunications 6,0 4,6
Telecommunications 14,0 0,6
Sub-total 20,0 5,2
Lesotho Centrales hydrauliques 15,0 12,5
Sub-total 15,0 12,5
Regional Air transport 15,0 11,0
Air transport 22,0 22,0
Energy 18,0 0,4
Global loan
General 15,0 8,0
Sub-total 70,0 41,4
TOTAL 344,4 241,0C 389/59 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
ANNEX II
Table II.1
BREAKDOWN (*) OF RISK CAPITAL FINANCINGS
Lome ´ III Lome ´I V
Amount decided % Amount decided %
Direct loans and pariticipations
— Loans 122,5 19 122,0 15
— Participations 1,0 0 24,5 3
Indirect loans
— ACP States 418,7 65 411,0 52
— Global loans 88,6 14 209,3 27
— Other development banks 14,7 2 5,7 1
— ECFIs — 0 15,0 2
Total 645,5 100 787,5 100
(*) Amounts calculated by the Court on the basis of data submitted by the EIB.C 389/60 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
COMMISSION REPLIES
1.  INTRODUCTION
Conduct of the audit
1.7. The Commission has undertaken a major
reorganisation of its files concerning the documentation
made available by the Bank. The Commission holds all
documentation concerning the major steps of risk capital
operations from 1993 to the present: financing proposal,
Article 28 Committee opinion, financing decision,
financing execution of payments and reimbursement.
Since 1997, these files have been readily available and
regularly utilised.
1.8. The EIB and its Audit Committee constantly
endeavoured to provide the Court of Auditors with every
assistance by providing the supplementary information
requested, preparing the logistics of the visit, helping the
Court to select meaningful samples to include in the visit,
holding a pre-visit general briefing on how risk capital is
used under the various mandates as well as
project-specific meetings with loan officers and/or
responsible Heads of Division on the projects included in
the visit, arranging for EIB staff familiar with projects to
accompany the joint visits and providing information and
documentation in answer to post-mission requests.
In any event, the EIB has always acted in accordance
with the tripartite agreement. At the Court’s request, this
agreement is now being renegotiated.
1.9. The EIB provided the Court with standard
procurement tables for the requested projects where an
official call for tender was applicable. The EIB is at the
disposal of the Court should it require any further
information.
2. RISK CAPITAL AS A FINANCIAL AID INSTRUMENT
Intervention sectors and allocation of funds
2.8 to 2.10. Under an internal agreement between the
representatives of the Governments of the Member States
meeting in the Council on the financing and management
of Community aid, an Article 28 Committee was set up
at the Bank. This Committee is made up of
representatives of the Governments of the Member States;
a representative of the Commission also takes part. The
Committee thus guarantees transparency, in particular
vis-à-vis  the Member States.
At nearly all of its meetings, the Article 28 Committee
receives several proposals for financing under the Lome ´
Convention, so that detailed comment in each report on
the background to the reasons for using risk capital is
not required. Most reports do provide a succinct
justification (e.g. non-creditworthiness of the country),
and usually the justification is rather obvious. The
question of the utilisation of risk capital as against the
EIB’s own resources is only rarely raised as an issue for
discussion, and where there are particular aspects on this
point they are discussed during the meetings to the
satisfaction of participants, as far as we are aware.
2.12(a) That the fishing projects in Mozambique and
Madagascar are profitable and generate hard currency is
a positive feature and fully justifies the operations. We
would make two comments.
(i) One cannot conclude that if a project is profitable,
financing can always be found from other sources. In
Mozambique and Madagascar a few years ago (and
still today) it was very difficult to find sources of
long-term financing for private-sector projects, on
account of the hazards and uncertainties of doing
business in those countries.
(ii) The EIB seeks under its Lome ´ mandate to encourage
private sector investors to invest in and manage
profitable ventures as is the case of the two projects
cited by providing part-financing of the projects. It
should be remembered that financing from risk
capital is designed to be repaid, so it is important to
try to select projects which are going to be
successful.
2.12(b) and (c) The statement does not sufficiently
reflect the very particular function fulfilled by the
financial intermediaries in the Dominican Republic and
New Caledonia. The Financial Intermediaries (FIs) help
to introduce and develop ‘banking habits’ among SME
clients, offering investment finance at prevailing prime
market rates through a network of qualified field service
employees. Alternative sources of finance for such SMEs
would be money-dealers offering very short-term loans
(weekly or monthly) at significantly higher interest rates.
The implementation of risk capital operations by the
European Investment Bank
Tendering procedures
2.13 to 2.15. Until recently, the EIB applied its normal
procurement procedures (bidding open at least to EU andC 389/61 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
ACP suppliers) to projects financed from risk capital
resources, as well as to projects financed from the Bank’s
own resources — in the interests of achieving the most
economically advantageous bids for the project. The
Cahora Bassa project in Mozambique was an example of
this policy. Following consultation with the Commission,
the EIB applies the more restrictive procurement
procedures of the EDF for risk capital financing.
Loan conditions and undertakings
2.16. It is true that ACP governments and borrowers
often do not comply with obligations to supply
information to the Bank in good time. The EIB monitors
the situation and chases up borrowers continuously, but
certainly not with 100 % success.
2.17(b)(c)(d) See 2.16 above. It should be noted that
fishing licences and quotas are a notoriously difficult area
in many countries of the world, including in the EU.
Where public administrative capacity is weak, as is the
case in Mozambique and Madagascar, difficulties can
certainly occur, even despite close monitoring by the
EIB.
2.18. See 2.16 above.
3.  INTEREST RATES AND THE USE OF THE INTEREST
MARGIN IN CASE OF ON-LENDING OPERATIONS
Level of the interest rates
3.4 to 3.8. The EIB has certainly not deliberately
developed any policy which might contravene the spirit
of the Convention. In setting the interest rates that are
applied to projects which it finances, the EIB has, on the
one hand, to respect the conditions of the Lome ´
Convention which specify subsidised rates and, on the
other hand, to take account of the need to ensure that
end-borrowers, notably in the private-sector, pay rates
more akin to market rates, where these can be
determined. This can indeed give rise to some anomalies,
but:
(i) it is quite normal for a loan to a strong borrower
with a strong guarantor to be at a lower interest rate
than a less well secured loan (so an own-resources
loan might well have a lower interest rate than a
riskier loan made from risk capital), and
(ii) a loan in a local ACP currency will normally carry a
significantly higher nominal interest rate than a loan
in ecu because of the underlying rates of expected
price inflation.
With regard to the hotel complex in Guinea (point 3.6)
any comparison between interest costs on the
own-resources loan and the risk-capital operation needs
to be nuanced: for the own resources loan, the borrower
incurs an additional cost for the provision of guarantees
acceptable to the Bank (as regards the risk capital
operation, the advantage to the final beneficiary is not
intended to reside in the interest rate, but rather in the
other financial conditions attached to the quasi-equity
nature of the operation).
3.9. The Lome ´ IV Convention caps interest payable on
risk capital loans at 3 % per annum but places no limit
on remuneration or profit sharing. Frequently a
profit-sharing component is added to a fixed-interest
component on a financing operation, which is not
prohibited by the Lome ´ Convention.
Remuneration of financial allocations from global loans
3.10 to 3.11. Since finance contracts are standardised as
far as possible, it is not surprising that mention should be
made of ‘reference’ rates even if in some cases there are
no ‘reference’ rates. The EIB therefore checks the rates
according to quarterly/half-yearly reports produced by
the Central Bank. This can only be done after the event,
because the Central Bank publishes the rates with a time
lag without modifying the standard terms of the
financing contract.
Mechanisms used for covering the exchange rate risk
3.13. Under Lome ´ III the borrower had to pay back the
loan in ecu or the equivalent in a European currency. The
exchange risk was based solely on the ecu and not on the
ecu or another European currency.
3.14 to 3.17. As regards risk-sharing, the key-words in
the last sentence of Article 234(2)(b) of the Lome ´
Convention are ‘on average’, i.e. over all risk capital
projects.
Allocation of 100 % of the FOREX risk to a final
beneficiary in certain cases is perfectly consistent with
Article 234 of the Convention (and indeed it would be
illogical to exonerate a promoter from FOREX risk if his
entire sales proceeds were denominated in FOREX — far
better in such a case to examine the other types of risk toC 389/62 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
which he might be exposed, and provide for mitigating
measures against those risks). Article 234 says that the
FOREX risk should be shared equally on average, and
this is what the EIB aims to achieve across the board.
As a matter of fact, under most of the small business
financing schemes (global loans) from risk capital, the
on-lending to SME sub-borrowers is denominated in local
currency — as typically SMEs sell into the local market
rather than the export market.
Use of the interest margin for administrative cost and for
development purposes
3.18. In selecting the FI or DFC (development finance
corporation), the EIB pays careful attention to the
soundness of its financial situation, its development role
and its support to the country’s economy. In this regard,
most of the DFCs are non-profit-making institutions with
a strong developmental impact, particularly in relation to
small enterprises. These criteria are in accordance with
Article 233(4)(b) of the Lome ´ IV Convention, First
Financial Protocol.
4.  PROJECTS FINANCED WITH RISK CAPITAL
Factors relating to the ‘long-term viability of the
project’
4.2. While it is true that the EIB and the Commission no
longer intervene directly vis-à-vis beneficiaries once
investments have been made, they do maintain indirect
supervision through their political dialogue with the local
authorities.
It is impossible to imagine any risk-capital operations
where there is not a danger that, in a number of cases
and in spite of all the guarantees provided, long-term
viability may be jeopardised by measures originating
within or outside the firm in question.
Fortunately the risks cited in the report as examples have
so far not become a reality, which puts their significance
into perspective.
Allocation procedures in respect of global loans
4.4. In the context of a global financing plan where the
rate at which financing is implemented cannot be fully
guaranteed, it is often the case that either the beneficiary
firm, using its own resources, or the Financial
Intermediary (FI), through additional temporary loans,
acts as a ‘bridge’. In fact the EIB’s intervention consists
merely of refinancing its own contribution, in so far as
this is a supplementary contribution and does not replace
that of the FI.
Disbursement period and disbursement rate
4.6. The global loan in Mozambique was made
alongside loans from the World Bank (from IDA
resources) and the French development aid programme:
none of the three loan facilities was very successful. Part
of the reason for the slow utilisation of the funding was
the insufficient level of the margins for the FIs, and
during the allocation/disbursement period of the loan
facilities the split of the total margin between the Central
Bank and the FIs was renegotiated — with the result that
the margin allowed to the FIs was increased over the
initial levels, on both the EIB and the World Bank credit
facilities alike.
Delay in implementation of projects and actions
4.9(a) The finance contract for the project was signed in
December 1994, but disbursements only started in 1997
(and are continuing in 1998). This project is being
co-financed by the EIB with the World Bank (credit from
IDA resources), and coordination between the two
institutions is close, notably as regards monitoring of the
project. There were a number of tough conditions prior
to first disbursement which had to be fulfilled by Zambia
including some sectoral reform issues and this explains
why disbursements could not be started for a period of
over two years.
4.9(b) The problems have since been resolved and the
remainder of the loan is being disbursed.
4.9(c) The main reason for the delay was the previous
government’s lack of resolve to carry out vital sector
reforms, in particular the ratification of the Electricity
Law, which is an important condition of disbursement in
the EIB’s finance contract. The law has been stalled in
Congress for two years due to political bickering ahead
of the 1996 presidential election and the tug-of-war
between two different vested interests (private power
investors versus importers of stand-by generating
equipment). The new government is pressing ahead with
sector reforms and disbursement of the loans has taken
place.
4.10. Every quarter, the Commission and the EIB take
stock of dormant commitments; after taking account of
the information exchanged and analysing the situation,
the EIB asks the Commission to decommit the unused
funds.C 389/63 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.12.98
Management of global loans by European Community
Financial Intermediaries (ECFIs)
4.11 and 4.13(a) Points noted. Appropriate
modifications were made to the follow-up ECFI II facility
approved in April 1998.
4.13(b) As indicated above (see 3.4 to 3.8), any
comparison between interest costs on the own-resources
loan and the risk-capital operation needs to be nuanced:
for the own resources loan, the borrower incurs an
additional cost for the provision of guarantees acceptable
to the Bank; as regards the risk-capital operation, the
advantage to the final beneficiary is not intended to
reside in the interest rate, but rather in the quasi-equity
nature of the operation, a shareholders’ advance.
5.  ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
5.2 to 5.4. The Commission services and the EIB work
closely together at the time of the ‘programming’ of
Community aid at the start of a Convention (e.g. the
signing of the National Indicative Programme and the
EIB’s Annex thereto). Close contacts (often informal) are
maintained between EIB staff and Commission
delegations throughout the ACP during the life of a
Convention.
Article 33(5) stipulates the role of the Commission
concerning the operations financed by the resources of
the fund and managed by the Bank. Each year the
Commission receives from the Bank a report of the
financial execution in coordination with the Bank
(coordination meetings take place at all levels).
On the basis of the draft proposals prepared by the Bank,
the Commission consults the geographical desks (and if
necessary the delegations) concerned and, accordingly,
presents its observations, comments, suggestions and
objections to the Bank.
5.6(a) The Council receives Article 29/33 reports, which
serve to meet the obligation to provide information
mentioned by the Court.
5.7. As a rule, the reports by the EIB’s Evaluation Unit
have a thematic or sectoral basis. The Unit’s work
programme covers all of the EIB’s operations and takes
into account the preponderance of the Bank’s activity
inside the Union. At present there are no plans for any
study involving EDF risk capital.
6.  CONCLUSION
The Commission and the EIB note with satisfaction that
the Court does not have any observations with regard to
the manner in which risk capital operations have been
prepared, implemented and monitored by the Bank.
As regards the Commission’s role, it is worth stressing
that both Article 1 of the Lome ´ IV Financial Protocol
and Article 10(2) of the Internal Agreement state that
risk capital is to be managed by the EIB. In so doing the
EIB acts on behalf of the Community, not of the
Commission (Article 10(2)). This is confirmed by Articles
58(1) and (2) of the Financial Regulation for the seventh
EDF.
Where the Commission is called on to assume
responsibility for the reliability of the EDF accounts, its
responsibility is confined, in the case of operations
financed under EIB management, to checking that the
amounts entered in the accounts match the information
supplied by the EIB.
With regard to the issue of evaluation of the risk capital
operations, the Commission will carry out a review of the
overall effects of risk capital operations on the
development of the ACP States before making concrete
proposals for any post-Lome ´ Convention.
Finally, the Commission feels that the Member States are
particularly well served when it comes to transparency, as
their representatives sit alongside the Commission on the
Article 28 Committee.